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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
A jury in the District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania convicted Daniel Pressler and Scott Shreffler 
of conspiracy to distribute heroin. While Pr essler appeals 
only his sentence, Shreffler challenges both his conviction 
and sentence. Shreffler's appeal requir es us to analyze the 
quality and quantity of evidence necessary to establish a 
conspiracy among individuals engaged in drug activity who 
are loosely associated. 
 
Shreffler submits that the evidence was insufficient to 
convict him of conspiring to distribute heroin. To make out 
a conspiracy charge, the Government must show: (1) a 
unity of purpose between the alleged conspirators; (2) an 
intent to achieve a common goal; and (3) an agr eement to 
work together toward that goal. The final factor--an 
agreement between the defendant and some other person-- 
is the essence of the offense, and ther e is no lesser 
standard for proving an agreement in drug cases. Although 
this and other courts have spoken of "factors" that tend to 
show the existence of a conspiracy, it is mor e accurate to 
say that the presence of certain facts often pr ovides 
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circumstantial evidence of the underlying agr eement that is 
itself necessary to make out a conspiracy case. 
 
The evidence here showed that Shreffler obtained and 
distributed a large amount of heroin. The Government 
demonstrated that the main person from whom Shr effler 
obtained his heroin, Pedro "Pete" Caban, also distributed 
the drug to many others, and that some of the people to 
whom Caban sold heroin had been referr ed to him by 
Shreffler. The evidence also established that many of the 
people to whom Shreffler and Caban pr ovided heroin sold 
the drug themselves, including a man with whom Shr effler 
lived for several months. And the Government proved that 
Shreffler was aware of all of the above facts. But there was 
simply no evidence that Shreffler ever agr eed to work with 
either his seller or his buyers to achieve a common goal or 
advance a common interest. 
 
The Government contends that the evidence her e was 
sufficient to establish a conspiracy under this Court's 
holding in United States v. Gibbs, 190 F .3d 188 (3d Cir. 
1999). What this contention misses is that in Gibbs there 
was no dispute that a drug conspiracy existed--the only 
issue was whether the defendant had joined it. Her e, in 
contrast, the question is whether a conspiracy existed at 
all. As a result, much of the discussion in Gibbs is simply 
inapposite. Because the Government never established the 
existence of an agreement between Shreffler and someone 
else, we will vacate his conviction on the gr ounds that the 
evidence was insufficient to support it. W e will, however, 
affirm the judgment of sentence as to Pr essler. 
 
I. 
 
Situated in rural Mifflin County in central Pennsylvania, 
Lewistown is home to less than 30,000 inhabitants. In the 
latter half of the 1990s, public officials noticed a disturbing 
rise in heroin use among students enrolled in the 
Lewistown school system. Local police deemed the pr oblem 
so severe that they requested federal assistance. Federal 
investigators determined that the heroin was coming from 
Philadelphia, and that it was being imported by Lewistown 
residents who would drive to Philadelphia to purchase 
heroin and then return to Lewistown to use and sell it. 
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On May 26, 1999, a grand jury indicted Pressler , 
Shreffler, and seven others for conspiring to violate the 
federal drug laws in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 846. Section (b) 
of Count One of the indictment charged the defendants 
with conspiring to "[i]llegally possess with intent to 
distribute and illegally distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
S 841(a)(1), HEROIN, a Schedule I contr olled substance 
while over the age of 18 years to individuals under the age 
of 21 years, in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 859(a)." 
 
Although their co-defendants pled guilty, Pr essler and 
Shreffler exercised their rights to a jury trial. The jury 
heard testimony from four of Pressler's and Shreffler's 
former co-defendants, as well as eight other witnesses. We 
provide the details of this testimony, infra at Part II(B), in 
the context of discussing Shreffler's claim that the evidence 
was insufficient to support his conviction. The court 
instructed the jury that they were to decide whether the 
defendants had "engaged in a conspiracy to distribute 
heroin," but, consistent with prevailing law at the time, did 
not ask the jury to determine the quantity of heroin that 
the defendants had conspired to distribute. The jury found 
Pressler and Shreffler guilty, and, via a special verdict form, 
also found that "the Government ha[d] proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that [Pressler and Shr effler], being 18 
years or older, conspired to distribute heroin to persons 
under 21 years old." 
 
The Probation Officer prepared Pr esentence Investigation 
Reports (PSIs) for both Pressler and Shr effler. Pressler 
lodged two objections, one of which is relevant here. In P 14 
of Pressler's PSI, the Probation Officer relayed the contents 
of a statement in which Craig Bedleyon told investigators 
that he had been hospitalized after overdosing on heroin 
obtained from Pressler. The Pr obation Officer relied on 
Bedleyon's statement in determining that Pr essler was 
eligible for an enhanced Offense Level of 38 pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(a)(2), which applies "if the defendant is 
convicted under 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), or 
(b)(1)(C) . . . and the offense of conviction establishes that 
death or serious bodily injury resulted fr om the use of the 
substance." Pressler objected, claiming that his sentence 
could not be enhanced based on Bedleyon's over dose 
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because it had not been charged in the indictment and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
The District Court held sentencing hearings for Pr essler 
on May 16 and June 2, 2000. At the close of the hearings, 
the court found that the Government had pr oved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Pressler provided the heroin upon 
which Bedleyon had overdosed, and opined that such 
findings were the province of the court rather than the jury. 
The court therefore determined that Pressler was eligible for 
the death or serious bodily injury enhancement, which set 
his base Offense Level at 38. Other enhancements raised 
Pressler's Offense Level to 43, and his Criminal History 
Category was determined to be IV. This combination 
ordinarily would have resulted in a mandatory life sentence, 
see U.S.S.G. Ch. 5 Pt. A, but the District Court decided to 
depart downward, noting that it found Pr essler to be "less 
culpable" than Shreffler. Stating that it had "a duty to avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparities" and characterizing 
Pressler's case as "present[ing] a circumstance outside of 
the heartland," the District Court sentenced Pr essler to 
serve 336 months in prison. 
 
The District Court held sentencing hearings concer ning 
Shreffler on June 16 and July 14, 2000, and made 
extensive factual findings on August 9, 2000. Employing a 
preponderance of the evidence standard, the court found 
that Shreffler had provided heroin to both Joseph Stoner 
and Scott Knouse, that Stoner and Knouse had over dosed 
on heroin provided by Shreffler , and that each had suffered 
serious bodily injury as a result. The court also determined 
that Shreffler had distributed between 69 and 113 grams of 
heroin. In response to these findings, the Probation Officer 
revised Shreffler's PSI and concluded that he was eligible 
for an enhanced Offense Level of 38 pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
S 2D1.1(a)(2). Two other enhancements gave Shr effler an 
Offense Level of 42, and this, in conjunction with a 
Criminal History Category of V, left Shr effler with a 
sentencing range of 360 months to life. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5 
Pt. A. On August 23, 2000, the District Court sentenced 
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Shreffler to 360 months imprisonment. Both Shreffler and 
Pressler filed timely appeals.1  
 
II. 
 
Shreffler's primary claim is that the evidence was 
insufficient to convict him of conspiring to distribute 
heroin. In so arguing, he takes up "a very heavy burden." 
United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1995). 
The Government needed to show only that Shr effler 
conspired with "someone--anyone." United States v. Obialo, 
23 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1994). Mor eover, because Shreffler 
is appealing from a jury verdict against him, "[w]e must 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government and must sustain [the] jury's verdict if `a 
reasonable jury believing the government's evidence could 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the gover nment proved 
all the elements of the offense.' " United States v. Rosario, 
118 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. 
Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1113 (3d Cir . 1991)). The elements 
of a charge of conspiracy are: (1) "a unity of purpose 
between the alleged conspirators;" (2) "an intent to achieve 
a common goal;" and (3) "an agreement to work together 
toward that goal." United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 
197 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
A. 
 
A perpetual problem plagues the law of conspiracy: There 
is no conspiracy unless the defendant agrees to work with 
someone else, but rarely is there dir ect evidence of a 
qualifying agreement. Consequently, the of fense is usually 
provable only through circumstantial evidence. Many 
courts (including this one) have spoken often of"factors" 
that tend to show the existence of a conspiracy. These 
"factors" are not direct proof that a conspiracy exists; 
rather, their presence serves as cir cumstantial evidence of 
the underlying agreement that is itself necessary to sustain 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. S 3231. We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
S 3742(a). 
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a conspiracy charge. See United States v. Kapp, 781 F.2d 
1008, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that the existence of a 
conspiracy "can be `inferred from evidence of related facts 
and circumstances from which it appears as a reasonable 
and logical inference, that the activities of the participants 
. . . could not have been carried on except as the r esult of 
a preconceived scheme or common understanding' " 
(quoting United States v. Ellis, 595 F .3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 
1979))). 
 
The challenge we have described is especially acute when 
it comes to drug conspiracies, which have comprised a 
large portion of the criminal dockets of federal courts in 
recent years. In the typical drug conspiracy, there is a 
primary dealer who will often have a high-level confederate 
or, at least, one or more mid-level confederates. The 
primary dealer will sell drugs personally and/or thr ough 
these confederates. These transactions may consist of small 
or moderately sized sales to end users, or of lar ge sales to 
individuals who then resell the drugs to those not under 
the direct or indirect control of the primary dealer. 
Accordingly, in many drug cases, the principal question is 
whether the people who buy drugs from the primary dealer 
or from his or her confederates have joined the underlying 
conspiracy. 
 
B. 
 
There is no question that Shreffler distributed a sizeable 
amount of heroin. Evidence at trial established at least 
nineteen named people to whom Shreffler pr ovided the 
drug, most of them on numerous occasions and several of 
them more than 30 times. Most of Shreffler's buyers were 
young--in fact, he sold drugs to several people who were 
sixteen years old or younger. Shreffler distributed heroin 
while at private homes, on public streets, and in public 
parks. He often insisted that people to whom he pr ovided 
heroin consume it in front of him, so as to obviate the 
possibility that they might turn the drugs over to the police. 
Shreffler personally introduced multiple people to heroin, 
taught at least two people how to inject themselves, and at 
least twice provided heroin to people immediately after they 
had been discharged from drug rehabilitation programs. 
 
                                7 
  
Shreffler obtained his heroin in Philadelphia. Numerous 
people accompanied him to buy heroin, and Shr effler made 
the trip in cars belonging to at least three different 
individuals.2 In Philadelphia, Shreffler would sometimes 
buy heroin from street dealers, though he would most often 
buy from Pedro "Pete" Caban. Caban sold heroin out of his 
house, and Government witnesses testified that they 
observed Caban sell to a large number of people. Shreffler 
bragged to brothers Anthony and Aaron Forshey (who both 
accompanied Shreffler to Philadelphia to buy heroin on 
several occasions) that he had "got[ten] Pete off the street" 
by purchasing so much heroin from him. Shreffler told 
Aaron Forshey that Caban provided "a safe way to buy 
heroin," because buying heroin fr om Caban at his house 
obviated the need to purchase heroin fr om street dealers. 
Caban sold heroin in prepackaged bundles that were 
sometimes stamped with the words "Banshee," 
"Competition," and "Grenades." 
 
Most of the people to whom Shreffler distributed heroin 
had other sources of supply (this source was often 
Pressler), and many of them distributed the drug as well. 
Many of the individuals with whom Shreffler traveled to 
Philadelphia to buy heroin also went without him, and 
some of them purchased heroin from Pedro Caban on those 
trips. 
 
Numerous witnesses testified that her oin (including that 
sold by Caban and Shreffler) is packaged in a standardized 
form and is distributed for a set price. Individual doses are 
contained in plastic "bags," and between 8 and 13 "bags" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. At oral argument, the Government contended that Shreffler gave 
people heroin in exchange for driving him to Philadelphia, and 
specifically referenced the testimony of James Walker. Walker testified 
that he had driven Shreffler to Philadelphia on 5 or 6 occasions, and 
stated that Pressler had given him heroin in exchange for a ride to 
Philadelphia, but never said the same thing about Shreffler. Though we 
must make all reasonable inferences in favor of the Government, "[t]he 
law . . . requires that `the infer ences drawn . . . have a logical and 
convincing connection to the facts established.' " United States v. 
Applewaite, 195 F.3d 679, 684 (3d Cir . 1999) (quoting United States v. 
Casper, 956 F.2d 416, 422 (3d Cir . 1992)). We may not "infer" the 
existence of evidence that was simply never pr offered. 
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are placed in a larger plastic bag to cr eate a "bundle." 
During the relevant time period, heroin sold for $10 per bag 
in Philadelphia and for $20 per bag in Lewistown, though 
a few witnesses testified that they were sometimes given 
volume discounts. Many of the Government's witnesses 
described seeing Shreffler in possession of multiple bundles 
of heroin. 
 
C. 
 
We turn to the question whether the evidence was 
sufficient to convict Shreffler for conspiracy to violate the 
federal drug laws. Though Shreffler bought a large amount 
of heroin from Caban, and sold her oin to a large number of 
people, " `a conspiracy requir es an agreement to commit 
some other crime beyond the crime constituted by the 
agreement itself.' " United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 
197 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Kozinski, 16 
F.3d 795, 808 (7th Cir. 1994)). In Shr effler's view, the 
evidence here simply does not show such an agr eement. 
 
1. 
 
In both its Opening and Supplemental Briefs, the 
Government assumes that this case is gover ned by United 
States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188 (3d Cir . 1999), and asserts 
that Gibbs mandates that we uphold Shr effler's conviction. 
The Government's argument, however , misses a critical 
distinction between this case and Gibbs. In Gibbs there was 
no question that a cocaine distribution ring headed by 
Terrence Gibbs and Darryl Coleman existed; the dispute 
was whether Antjuan Sydnor (who had purchased large 
amounts of heroin from Gibbs) had agr eed to join the 
conspiracy. See id. at 195, 200. Her e, in contrast, the 
question is whether there was a conspiracy between any of 
these individuals at all. We do not suggest that the 
Government's burden of proof is higher where the existence 
of an underlying group is contested. Instead, we emphasize 
that certain types of circumstantial evidence become 
substantially more probative if it can be established that a 
conspiracy existed and the only remaining question is 
whether the defendant was a part of it. 
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To see why, imagine a situation where the defendant is a 
street-level drug dealer. If it is shown that an organized 
gang controls drug distribution in the defendant's 
neighborhood and that the gang has divided the 
neighborhood into zones in which only a single dealer may 
operate, then the fact that the defendant consistently sells 
his or her drugs only with certain geographical parameters 
would provide evidence that the defendant both knew of the 
existence of the conspiracy and was a participant in it. But 
were there no evidence of a larger conspiracy to control 
drug distribution, then the fact that the defendant did all of 
his or her sales in a given area would be essentially 
irrelevant to the question whether the defendant was the 
member of a conspiracy.3 
 
As a result, much of the language from Gibbs upon 
which the Government relies is inapposite. For example, 
Gibbs acknowledged that " `even an occasional supplier (and 
by implication an occasional buyer for redistribution) can 
be shown to be a member of the conspiracy by evidence, 
direct or inferential, of knowledge that she or he was part 
of a larger operation.' " Id.  at 198 (quoting United States v. 
Price, 13 F.3d 711, 728 (3d Cir. 1994) and citing United 
States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 594 (3d Cir. 1989)) 
(emphasis added). Such a precept can per form analytic 
work if it is clear that a drug conspiracy existed and the 
only question is whether the defendant was a part of it, but 
it is singularly unhelpful where the question is whether a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Illustrative of this point is United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711 (3d 
Cir. 
1994), where the evidence established the existence of a criminal 
organization known as the Junior Black Mafia ("JBM"). See id. at 716. As 
relevant here, defendant Anthony Long contended that the evidence was 
insufficient to convict him of conspiring to distribute cocaine and 
heroin, 
arguing that it showed only that he was an"independent drug dealer 
who associated with members of the JBM." Id.  at 731. In explaining why 
we disagreed, we noted, inter alia, that Long had two significant social 
events (a wedding and a funeral) "at which many, although not 
necessarily all, JBM members gathered." Id. Standing alone, that Long 
attended a given wedding or funeral would do nothing to show that he 
was a member of a criminal conspiracy. But once it was shown that the 
funeral and the wedding were significant social events for the members 
of the JBM, the fact that Long was present on those occasions provided 
circumstantial evidence that he was a member of that organization. 
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"larger operation" was present at all. Because here there 
was no independent evidence of an overarching conspiracy, 
that Shreffler knew that his seller sold drugs to other 
people or that some of his buyers did likewise pr ovides 
scant support for the proposition that any of these 
individuals agreed to cooperate with one another. 
 
This basic difference also explains why one of the factors 
about which we spoke in Gibbs does not translate well to 
the situation at bar. Gibbs stated that "the length of 
affiliation between the defendant and the conspiracy" was 
relevant to determining whether the defendant agreed to 
join it. Id. at 199 (emphasis added). W e explained that this 
factor is relevant because "when a defendant drug buyer 
has repeated, familiar dealings with members of a 
conspiracy, that buyer probably comprehends fully the 
nature of the group with whom he [or she] is dealing, is 
more likely to depend heavily on the conspiracy as the sole 
source of his [or her] drugs, and is mor e likely to perform 
drug-related acts for conspiracy members in an effort to 
maintain his [or her] connection to them." Id. at 199. This 
factor (and our explanation for it) assumes the existence of 
an underlying conspiracy; after all, it makes little sense to 
talk about the defendant's comprehension of the nature of 
the "group" with whom he or she is dealing unless it has 
already been shown that there is an underlying group. The 
lack of an underlying (or overarching) conspiracy is the 
Government's problem here. 
 
Lastly, and contrary to our admonitions, the Gover nment 
seeks to use one of the Gibbs factors as dir ect (and, indeed, 
dispositive) evidence of the existence of a conspiracy, rather 
than as circumstantial evidence of the underlying 
agreement necessary to create a conspiracy in the first 
place. The Government claims that many of Shr effler's 
buyers "were not simple purchasers of drugs from Shreffler; 
they knew that Shreffler obtained his her oin from `Pete' 
because [they] accompanied Shreffler on[trips to] purchase 
[ heroin] from `Pete' in Philadelphia on more than one 
occasion, and they knew about one another and about 
Shreffler's distribution to other persons. Under the holding 
of Gibbs then, they were conspirators with Shreffler in the 
distribution of heroin . . . and he was a conspirator with 
each of them." 
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In upholding the conviction in Gibbs, we str essed that 
Sydnor (the buyer) had been aware that Gibbs (the seller, 
who was unquestionably a member of a drug conspiracy) 
sold drugs to people other than himself, and emphasized 
that Gibbs had known that Sydnor resold drugs that he 
bought from Gibbs to other people. See id.  at 201. That 
Sydnor knew that Gibbs sold drugs to many other people 
was circumstantial evidence that Sydnor knew that Gibbs 
was part of a larger distribution ring, and the fact that 
Gibbs was aware that Sydnor resold the drugs that he got 
from Gibbs was circumstantial evidence that Sydnor was a 
part of that ring. See id. at 201. But the mere fact that a 
defendant comprehends that a person from whom he or she 
buys drugs or to whom he or she sells drugs also sells 
drugs to others is not itself sufficient pr oof that the 
defendant and the other person are conspirators. Except for 
those who grow, harvest, or process contr olled substances 
themselves, all users and dealers get their drugs fr om 
someone else. Importantly, in Gibbs we did not hold that 
such evidence standing alone proved that Sydnor had 
joined the Gibbs/Coleman conspiracy; instead, we pointed 
to numerous other significant pieces of evidence, which we 
set forth in the margin,4 that bore upon that question, and 
ultimately held that all of the "evidence [was] sufficient to 
support the conclusion that Sydnor intended to join the 
[Gibbs/Coleman] conspiracy and shared the conspiracy's 
goal of distributing cocaine for profit." Id. at 202-03. The 
fact that several of Shreffler's buyers knew that Shreffler 
often got his drugs from Caban and that they knew about 
each other is not enough to establish an agr eement among 
them to distribute heroin. Having established that Gibbs is 
not dispositive here, we now turn to the Government's 
arguments as to why the evidence was sufficient to support 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Government had surreptitiously recorded telephone conversations 
between Sydnor, Gibbs, and another man. They revealed that: (1) Gibbs 
had converted powder cocaine into crack for Sydnor; (2) Sydnor had 
purchased a large amount of drugs fr om Gibbs; (3) Sydnor had offered 
to provide physical protection for Gibbs; (4) Sydnor had solicited advice 
from Gibbs about the commercial aspects of the drug trade.; (5) Gibbs 
had sold Sydnor drugs on credit; and (6) Sydnor and Gibbs had 
conducted their business in code. See Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 200-02. 
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the conclusion that Shreffler conspir ed with particular 
individuals. 
 
2. 
 
We begin with Caban and the Forsheys, all of whom were 
named in the indictment. Both Aaron and Anthony Forshey 
traveled with Shreffler to Philadelphia numer ous times to 
acquire heroin, but both also often went without him. The 
Forsheys originally purchased heroin fr om street dealers, 
but Shreffler eventually introduced them to Caban, 
explaining that Caban offered a "safer" way to purchase the 
drug. Shreffler bragged to the Forsheys that his purchases 
from Caban were so sizeable that they wer e responsible for 
"taking [Pete] off the street" and allowing Caban to sell 
heroin directly out of his house. 
 
This evidence, says the Government, "was sufficient, at 
the very least, to establish an agreement between Shreffler 
and `Pete' to distribute heroin to the Forsheys." We 
disagree. Had Shreffler promised to steer business Caban's 
way in exchange for a discount on his own pur chases or for 
a share of Caban's profits, the two would unquestionably 
have qualified as co-conspirators. Unfortunately for the 
Government, however, there was simply no evidence of 
such an agreement. Instead, all that the evidence showed 
was that Shreffler introduced the Forsheys to another, 
superior source of supply from which Shr effler himself had 
purchased a large amount of heroin. 
 
What was lacking here can be illustrated by use of 
analogy. Imagine the owners of two convenience stor es, X 
and Y. Both originally obtain soda for r esale from various, 
unaffiliated wholesalers, but X discovers that wholesaler Z 
is easier to deal with. X then begins to buy all of her soda 
from Z (a sizeable amount) and infor ms Y that Z provides a 
superior source of supply. Y then begins to purchase a 
great deal of soda from Z as well. Just as this evidence, 
standing alone, would be insufficient to pr ove an agreement 
between X and Z to distribute soda to Y, the evidence in 
this case was not enough to support a conclusion that 
Shreffler and Caban conspired to distribute heroin to the 
Forsheys. It is common for people to tell their friends about 
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a good store or restaurant. Though the Government proved 
that Shreffler was a very good customer to Caban, that he 
had recommended Caban to others, and that Caban 
benefitted from Shreffler's patr onage, it did not show that 
Shreffler and Caban ever agreed to work together on 
anything. 
 
Likewise, we conclude that there was insufficient 
evidence to support a finding that Shreffler conspired with 
the Forsheys. The Government notes that "the evidence at 
trial established that the heroin [that Shr effler and the 
Forsheys] obtained from `Pete' was not solely for their own 
use but was sold and otherwise distributed by them to 
others." "Thus," submits the Government, "the Forsheys 
admitted that they conspired with `Pete' and with Shreffler 
to distribute heroin." The Government reads too much into 
this evidence--the fact that the Forsheys and Shr effler 
knew that they were involved in the same "business" (in 
this case, the distribution of heroin) and that they obtained 
much of their supply from the same "distributor" (Caban) 
simply does not establish that they agreed to pool their 
"efforts." We therefor e hold that there was insufficient 
evidence to support a jury finding that Shr effler conspired 
with Pedro Caban, Aaron Forshey, or Anthony Forshey.5 
 
3. 
 
Although he was not named in the indictment, the 
Government's conspiracy case was strongest with respect to 
Charles "Chuckie" Stoner. Stoner and Shreffler traveled to 
Philadelphia together to purchase heroin on several 
occasions, although each also frequently went without the 
other. Shreffler was one of the people who introduced 
Stoner to Caban, and the latter later became a major 
source of supply for the former. Shreffler essentially lived 
with Stoner for "four or five months." During that time, 
both Shreffler and Stoner sold heroin out of Stoner's home, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Government's Brief also summarily alleges that James Walker was 
a co-conspirator of Shreffler, but elaborates only that Walker bought 
heroin from both Shreffler and Charles Stoner. In the absence of 
stronger evidence than this, we conclude that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a conclusion that Shreffler conspired with Walker. 
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people would call "seven or eight" times a day about 
purchasing heroin. Stoner obtained some of his heroin from 
Shreffler, and would sometimes sell heroin to those who 
came to his house looking for Shreffler when the latter was 
not present. 
 
This case is somewhat similar to United States v. Powell, 
113 F.3d 464 (3d Cir. 1994), wher e we found the evidence 
sufficient to support a jury's finding that James Powell had 
conspired with his brother Antonio Powell to distribute 
cocaine. In that case: 
 
       A witness testified that James and Antonio Powell lived 
       together, that they both sold cocaine, that they shared 
       plastic bags to package the cocaine, and that if one of 
       the brothers ran out of cocaine to sell, the other 
       brother would supply it. As noted, James Powell 
       assured a police informant that the cocaine the Powell 
       brothers would sell the next day would match in 
       quality the cocaine sold earlier by Antonio Powell. 
       During a recorded telephone conversation, Antonio 
       Powell consulted James Powell before setting the sales 
       price for cocaine[, and James Powell also served as a 
       lookout and driver when Antonio Powell sold cocaine to 
       an undercover agent]. 
 
Id. at 467. 
 
The relationship between Shreffler and Stoner bears 
some resemblance to that between the Powell br others. Like 
the Powells, Shreffler and Stoner lived together for several 
months, and both of them sold drugs out of their shared 
residence on a daily basis. And there was evidence that 
Stoner would sometimes supply drugs to customers when 
Shreffler was not available to do so. But, standing alone, all 
that this evidence proved was that Shreffler and Stoner 
were drug dealers who lived together for a time; it would 
not, in our view, be enough to show the existence of an 
agreement between them. 
 
Moreoever, in Powell ther e was a great deal of evidence 
that the brothers had pooled their efforts, but none of the 
types of evidence that existed in that case ar e present here. 
First, as noted above, James Powell acted as a lookout 
when Antonio Powell conducted drug sales, and that fact 
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alone may well have been enough to show the existence of 
a conspiracy between the brothers. When one person serves 
as a lookout during another person's drug deals, it suggests 
a unity of purpose and an intent to achieve a common goal 
(to sell drugs without being caught) and an agr eement to 
work together toward that goal (because one does not serve 
as a lookout without agreeing to do so). In this case, 
however, there was no testimony that Shr effler or Stoner 
ever served as a lookout for the other. 
 
Second, the fact that the Powell brothers consulted each 
other before setting a sales price for a given deal strongly 
implied that they had agreed to coordinate their activities. 
Here, in contrast, there was no evidence of such 
conversations between Shreffler and Stoner . Lastly, the fact 
that the Powell brothers shared packaging materials 
demonstrated that they had integrated their activities, 
which implied the presence of an underlying agr eement. 
There was no such evidence here. 
 
Also lacking here are the sort of facts that we found 
sufficient to support the conviction in Gibbs . In Gibbs, there 
was evidence that Sydnor (the buyer) had offer ed to provide 
physical protection for Gibbs (the seller). See 190 F.3d at 
200--01. That Sydnor was willing to stick his neck out for 
Gibbs suggested that he had a greater stake in the latter's 
safety than a typical buyer, which in tur n implied that a 
cooperative relationship existed between the two of them. 
See id. at 201. There was also evidence that Gibbs had sold 
Sydnor drugs on credit, which meant that each had an 
economic stake in the other's continued success. See id. 
Lastly, Gibbs and Sydnor conducted their business in code, 
which demonstrated a considerable degree of coordination 
and suggested the presence of a cooperative r elationship. 
See id. at 200-02. The Shreffler/Stoner r elationship had 
none of these hallmarks. 
 
The only direct evidence of an agreement between 
Shreffler and Stoner was a single sentence in James 
Walker's testimony. Walker stated that Stoner "would sell 
for Scott when Scott wasn't around." Although the question 
is quite close in light of the jury's verdict and our resultant 
standard of review, we conclude that this evidence is not 
strong enough to support Shreffler's conviction. 
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Walker made the statement at issue in r esponse to the 
question "Tell us how you were intr oduced to [Charles 
Stoner]." Walker's full answer r eads: "I went to his house, 
and I bought a bag of heroin from him. He would sell for 
Scott when Scott wasn't around." The next question was: 
"How do you know he was selling for Scott Shr effler?" 
Walker got as far as saying "Because he told me that --" 
before being interrupted by an objection. The objection was 
first sustained, though it was eventually overruled after a 
colloquy between the court and counsel for both sides. At 
that point, the prosecutor asked Walker to "[t]ell us what 
was said to you by Stoner concerning the her oin." In 
response, Walker stated: "I went ther e and he was out of 
heroin. He said he'd have to call Scott to get some more. So 
he was getting it from Scott to sell." W alker's testimony 
then turned to a discussion of his dealings with Scott 
Shreffler. 
 
What the above makes manifest is that it is unclear what 
Walker meant by the critical statement or the basis upon 
which he made it. Perhaps by "sell for Scott" Walker meant 
that he thought that Stoner sold heroin on behalf of 
Shreffler rather than in lieu of Shr effler when the latter was 
not around the house. But even if this is the correct 
reading of Walker's statement, the r ecord contains no way 
to determine the basis of his belief. W alker started to 
address that issue, but was interrupted by an objection and 
the prosecutor never returned to it. The only information 
we have that bears on the basis for Walker's belief is his 
response to the next question put to him, when he said: "I 
went there and he was out of heroin. He said he'd have to 
call Scott to get some more. So he was getting it from Scott 
to sell." If Walker's belief that Stoner was selling "for" 
Shreffler was based only on the facts contained in the 
above-quoted answer, then that evidence would be 
insufficient to support a finding that ther e was an 
agreement between Shreffler and Stoner for the reasons 
stated above. If Walker's belief was based on something 
else, then there is nothing in the recor d to explain or justify 
Walker's inchoate conclusion. 
 
We must, of course, view the evidence as a whole and in 
the light most favorable to the Government; moreover, we 
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must make all reasonable inferences in its favor. See United 
States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 1997). But it 
is also the case that, even after doing that, the question 
remains whether a reasonable jury couldfind that the 
Government had proved each and every element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. Although the 
evidence here would almost certainly be enough were this 
a civil case and the burden of proof a mer e preponderance 
of the evidence, this is a criminal case and the Government 
had a much higher burden to surmount. Cf. Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (holding that 
a court considering a motion for summary judgment must 
take into account the standard of proof that would apply at 
trial, and specifically drawing an analogy to situations 
where courts consider motions for acquittal in criminal 
cases). In the absence of other evidence from which it could 
be inferred that Shreffler and Stoner had agreed to a 
common endeavor (and there is none), we hold that 
Walker's ambiguous and unexplicated statement is not 
enough to support a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Shreffler and Stoner were confederates who agreed to 
work together as opposed to two drug dealers who shared 
the same house for a time. 
 
For a reason that escapes us, the Gover nment did not 
charge Shreffler with distribution of heroin--a crime for 
which the evidence at trial was more than sufficient to 
convict, and for which he could have received the sentence 
challenged here.6 Instead, it opted to indict and try him 
only for conspiracy to distribute heroin. But a conspiracy 
conviction may stand only if the Gover nment proves the 
existence of an underlying agreement. Ther e is no special 
rule for, or lesser burden in, drug cases. To parody a 
familiar literary allusion, a conspiracy is a conspiracy is a 
conspiracy. Because the Government never demonstrated 
the existence of an agreement between Shr effler and at 
least one other person, we will set aside Shr effler's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We express no opinion as to whether the Government may re-indict 
Shreffler for distribution. 
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conviction on the grounds that the evidence was 
insufficient to support it.7 
 
III. 
 
Pressler advances only one argument befor e us. He 
contends that his sentence was imposed in violation of 
 
(Text continued on page 21) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Shreffler also contends that the District Court: (1) erred in allowing 
testimony about used heroin packages and syringes; (2) violated the 
teachings of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) by finding that 
he had distributed heroin that resulted in two overdoses instead of 
submitting the issue to the jury; and (3) err ed in determining the 
amount of heroin attributable to him and in determining that he had 
provided the heroin resulting in the Krouse and Stoner overdoses. In 
light of our holding that there was insufficient evidence to convict 
Shreffler on the underlying conspiracy char ge, we need not address 
these issues. 
 
Prompted by questioning from a member of the panel, Shreffler also 
contended at oral argument that the District Court had erred in 
determining that he was eligible for an enhanced Offense Level of 38 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(a)(2), which applies "if the defendant is 
convicted under 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), or (b)(1)(C), . . . 
and 
the offense of conviction establishes that death or serious bodily injury 
resulted from the use of the substance." The basic thrust of the 
argument is that Shreffler's "of fense of conviction establishes" only 
that, 
being over 18 years old, he conspired to distribute heroin to persons 
under 21, but it does not "establish that death or seriously bodily injury 
resulted" from the heroin that Shr effler conspired to distribute. If this 
submission were correct (and had we upheld the conviction), then 
Shreffler would have needed to be resentenced to a substantially shorter 
term of imprisonment because the highest Of fense Level for which he 
could otherwise be eligible would be 32. The ef fort to determine the 
proper meaning of "offense of conviction" in the context of drug cases 
illustrates a potentially serious problem with regard to the drafting of 
the 
Guidelines in the wake of Apprendi. Although we need not decide this 
claim because of our decision to vacate Shreffler's conviction, we 
identify 
the problem for the benefit of the Sentencing Commission and suggest 
that it may wish to consider redrafting S 2D1.1(a)(2). 
The Guidelines never define "offense of conviction," but several factors 
lead us to believe that the phrase includes only the facts underlying the 
specific criminal offense for which the defendant was convicted. 
Application Note 1(l) to S 1B1.1 states that" `[o]ffense' means the 
offense 
of conviction and all relevant conduct under S 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) 
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unless a different meaning is specified or is otherwise clear from the 
context." (emphasis added). This formulation makes manifest that 
"offense of conviction" is narrower than "offense." This supposition is 
supported by Section 1B1.3, which states that a defendant's "Offense 
Conduct" is determined by examining 
 
       all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, 
       commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the 
       defendant; and in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal 
activity 
       . . . [includes] all reasonably for eseeable acts and omissions of 
       others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, 
that 
       occurred during the commission of the of fense of conviction, in 
       preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to 
avoid 
       detection or responsibility for that of fense. 
 
Significantly, this language suggests that not all acts or omissions 
committed or willfully caused by a defendant during the commission of 
the offense of conviction are themselves part of the offense of 
conviction, 
and seems to indicate that "offense of conviction" includes only the facts 
undergirding the specific offense for which the defendant was convicted, 
whereas "Relevant Conduct" includes other , uncharged and related 
activities. 
 
Additional support for our narrower reading of "offense of conviction" 
comes from U.S.S.G. S 1B1.2(a) (Applicable Guideline), which instructs 
sentencing courts to begin by "determin[ing] the offense guideline section 
in Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) applicable to the offense of conviction 
(i.e., the offense conduct charged in the indictment or information of 
which 
the defendant was convicted)." (emphasis added). Also relevant is the 
amendment history of S 3A1.1(a) (Hate Crime Motivation of Individual 
Victim). In the past, that Section pr ovided for a three step Offense 
Level 
enhancement "[i]f the finder of fact . . . determines . . . that the 
defendant intentionally selected any victim . . . as the object of the 
offense because of actual or perceived race, color, religion, national 
origin, ethnicity, gender, disability or sexual orientation." U.S.S.G. 
S 3A1.1(a), historical notes, 1997 amendments, available in Westlaw 
(emphasis added). In 1997, however, the operative language was changed 
to require that the defendant select the victim "as the object of the 
offense of conviction." Id. (emphasis added). "Consistent with Congress' 
intent to punish a defendant whose primary objective in committing a 
hate crime was to harm a member of a particular class of individuals," 
the Sentencing Commission explained that the amendment was 
necessary to clarify "that the enhancement in subsection (a) is limited to 
the victim of the defendant's offense of conviction." (emphasis added). 
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Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because it 
was arrived at in part as a result of sentencing findings 
made by the District Court. He is incorrect. 
 
The jury convicted Pressler of conspiracy to distribute an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
This history supports our view that "offense of conviction" includes only 
the substantive crime for which a particular defendant was convicted. 
 
If we are correct, then the critical inquiry involves identifying the 
substantive crime for which the defendant was convicted. But Apprendi 
makes answering that question difficult in many drug cases. Before 
Apprendi, the consensus view was that 21 U.S.C. S 841 contained but a 
single "crime," which was codified in S 841(a). See, e.g., United States 
v. 
Chapple, 985 F.2d 729, 731 (3d Cir . 1993). That Section makes it illegal 
to, inter alia, "knowingly or intentionally . . . manufacture, distribute, 
or 
dispense . . . a controlled substance." Section S 841(b) then lists an 
enormous range of variables that operate to cr eate sentencing exposures 
ranging from "not more than one year" to a mandatory life sentence. 
Compare 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(3) (distribution of a Schedule V controlled 
substance) with id. S 841(b)(1)(C) (distribution of a Schedule I or II 
controlled substance by a person who has a prior conviction for a felony 
drug offense and where death or serious bodily injury results from the 
use of that substance). Prior to Apprendi , it was the view of this Court 
that all S 841(b) findings were for the sentencing court rather than the 
jury. See, e.g., Chapple, 985 F.2d at 731. Under such a regime, it would 
have been reasonable to conclude that a defendant's "offense of 
conviction" included the jury's finding that the defendant had violated 
S 841(a) and the sentencing court's deter mination as to which of the 
S 841(b) factors were present. 
 
Such reasoning, however, is problematic after Apprendi, whose central 
teaching is that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact 
that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the pr escribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt." 530 U.S. at 466. The "prescribed statutory maximum" is the 
longest sentence that a defendant could receive based solely on the facts 
necessarily encompassed within the jury's ver dict of guilty. See, e.g., 
United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 863-64 (3d Cir. 2000). For 
example, if a jury finds a defendant guilty of"distribution of cocaine" 
without making a specific finding as to quantity or any other factors, 
then the "prescribed statutory maximum" is 20 years. Thus, to avoid 
rendering one of the most significant federal criminal statutes 
unconstitutional, many of our sister circuits have held that any fact that 
increases a defendant's sentence beyond that which would have been 
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unspecified amount of heroin, specificallyfinding that he 
was over 18 years old and that he had conspir ed to 
distribute heroin to persons under the age of 21. (Pr. App. 
51). Section 846 of Title 21 of the United States Code 
makes it unlawful to conspire to violate the federal drugs 
laws, and provides that those who do ar e subject to the 
same penalties as those who commit the underlying 
offenses. Absent a quantity finding, distribution of heroin 
generally carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in 
prison. See 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(C). But 21 U.S.C. S 859(a) 
doubles all applicable penalties for persons over the age of 
18 who distribute narcotics to persons under the age of 21. 
Based solely on the jury's verdict, ther efore, Pressler's 
maximum sentence was 40 years--twelve years more than 
his ultimate sentence of 336 months. A defendant has no 
valid Apprendi claim where, as here, his ultimate sentence 
is less than that which would have been authorized by the 
jury's verdict. See United States v. W illiams, 235 F.3d 858, 
863 (3d Cir. 2000); see also id. at 862 ("Apprendi does not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
permissible absent that fact is an "element" of the S 841 "offense." See, 
e.g., United States v. Westmoreland, 240 F.3d 618, 632-33 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(citing cases). 
 
Though saving S 841 from unconstitutionality in many situations, this 
interpretation--in conjunction with the possible interpretation of 
"offense 
of conviction" outlined previously--may have consequences not intended 
by the Sentencing Commission. If the statutory interpretation embraced 
by our sister circuits is correct, thenS 841 describes not one, but many 
"crimes," and the "crime" for which Shr effler was convicted was 
conspiracy to distribute an unspecified amount of heroin by persons over 
18 to persons under 21. See 21 U.S.C. S 846; S 841(a); S 841(b)(1)(C); 
S 859(a). And if the interpretation of"offense of conviction" that we 
outlined above is right, then Shreffler's"offense of conviction" did not 
"establish" that "death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of 
the" heroin that he conspired to distribute, and the District Court erred 
in finding that he was eligible for an enhanced Of fense Level pursuant 
to U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(a)(2). We ar e cognizant that this potential result 
may 
be at odds with the intent of the Sentencing Commission, which, after 
all, wrote the Guidelines long before Apprendi altered the background 
legal landscape. We therefore call this matter to the attention of the 
Commission and suggest that this (and possibly other Guidelines 
provisions) may need to be redrafted in light of Apprendi. 
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apply to . . . increase[s] . . . under the Sentencing 
Guidelines."). We will, therefor e, affirm Pressler's sentence. 
 
IV. 
 
The judgment of conviction in No. 00-2588 will be 
vacated, and the matter remanded to the District Court 
with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal in favor 
of Defendant Scott Shreffler. The judgment of sentence in 
No. 00-1824 will be affirmed. The Clerk is directed to send 
this opinion to the Chair and Chief Counsel of the United 
States Sentencing Commission, calling their attention to 
footnote 7. 
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